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Introduction
America’s Failing Health Care System
The United States is in a health care crisis. The health care system is
inefficient and creates much national debt. We spend more than any other country
in the world on health care, but get much lower health outcomes.
Currently, the U.S. is the “most powerful, innovative, and richest nation the
planet has ever known.”1 Yet, it is not proportionally healthy compared to other
nations. A study done by the World Health Organization (WHO) ranked the United
States 37th out of 191 countries for health care systems in 2010.2 This was based on
overall health care efficiency, including cost and output.
Most developed and rich countries in the world outstrip the United States in
nearly all health statistics, including longer life expectancy and lower infant
mortality. The United States stands near the bottom in most important rankings:
access to and quality of medical care.3
A 2008 report by the Commonwealth Fund found that the United States
ranked lowest of all developed countries for “deaths before age 75 from conditions
that are at least partially modifiable with effective medical care.”4 The U.S. scored
twice as high as France and Japan. Among 19 wealthy countries, the U.S. ranked 19th

1

T.R. Reid. The Healing of America: A Global Quest for Better, Cheaper, and Fairer
Health Care. New York: The Penguin Press, 2009: 28.
2 World Health Organization. Measuring Overall Health System Performance For 191
Countries. By A.J. Tandon, et al. GPE Discussion Paper Series: No. 30.
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/paper30.pdf.
3 T.R. Reid, op. cit., p. 9
4 Cathy Schoen, et al. “U.S. Health System Performance: A National Scorecard.”
Health Affairs Web Exclusive, September 20, 2006, p. W457.
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in curing people who could be cured with decent care.5 A Commonwealth Fund
study done between 2001-2004 showed that Americans diagnosed with asthma die
sooner than their counterparts in seven other countries.6 Americans with diabetes
die younger than diabetics in any other developed country.7 Among the “nine rich
nations,” the per-capita rate of “deaths due to surgical or medical mishaps” was
highest by far in the U.S.8 Out of 23 wealthy countries the United States ranks dead
last when it comes to keeping newborns alive.9 In a 2006 survey by the
Commonwealth Fund scoring countries on “healthy life expectancy at age 60,” the
U.S. was tied for last, while Japan came in first.10
These low health rankings would make sense if the U.S. spent very little on
health care. This is not the case. America spends 17.8% of its Gross Domestic
Product on health care expenditures alone.11 Per capita health costs equal $8,362
annually. This is roughly twice as much as other rich countries spend on health care.
The citizens and politicians of America are ready for change. In the 2008
election, only 18% of Americans said the U.S. health care system was doing well.
79% said they wanted to see either “fundamental change” or “a complete
overhaul.”12 President Barack Obama responded to this growing discontent by

5

Ellen Nolte, et al. “Measuring the Health of Nations: Updating an Earlier Analysis,”
Health Affairs (2008): 71.
6 The Commonwealth Fund, Multinational Comparisons of Health Systems Data,
November 2006.
7 T.R. Reid, op. cit., 32.
8 ibid.
9 ibid.
10 Cathy Schoen, et al., op. cit., 71.
11 This and other information concerning American health care can be found on the
World Health Organizations website at http://www.who.int/en/.
12 Thomas Bodenheimer and Kevin Grumbach. Understanding Health Policy: A Clinical
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making health care reform a main tenant of his campaign and continued to focus on
health care reform during the first term of his presidency. He succeeded in passing
the Affordable Care Act, a piece of health care reform legislation that will go into
effect between 2013-2014.
Although this legislation is a step in the right direction, it is not the final
answer to all problems within the health care system. Cross-cultural comparison
can also teach invaluable lessons.

France Does it Best
WHO ranked France 1st out of 191 countries for health care systems in 2010
based on overall health care efficiency.13 This clear proof of their superior health
care system make the nation an ideal candidate for study by health care reform
leaders in the United States.
France spends 11.9% of its GDP on health care expenditures.14 The country’s
health costs per capita amounts to only $4,021 annually. This is half the cost of
health care in America. A study by the Bank of America in 2006 found that if
Americans could get our health care spending down to the French level we would
save about $600 billion annually.15
France not only spends far less than the U.S., but it also produces outcomes
that far surpass those of the United States. The French have a higher life expectancy

Approach (Lange Medical Books, 2005): 3.
World Health Organization, Measuring Overall Health System Performance, op. cit.
14 This and other information concerning French health care can be found on the
World Health Organizations website at http://www.who.int/en/.
15 Wall Street Journal, January 25, 2007, p. C1.
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at birth than Americans.16 France does a better job than almost any other country
both in encouraging health and in treating those who get sick.17 The French system
also does the best job of curing people with curable diseases.18 These are just a few
of France’s health care successes.
France has created an efficient health care system and achieved what the
United States has not: universal health care. There are three main insurance funds in
France. One is for salaried workers, one is for professionals and the self employed,
and one is for farmers.19 These are accompanied by 11 smaller insurance funds
covering specific industries. Premiums are extremely cheap, particularly for those
under employer insurance.20 The French can also buy supplemental health
insurance to cover the costs not covered by the public insurance companies. This
insurance is purchased from either non-profit cooperatives or from for-profit
insurance companies.21 The supplemental insurance premiums are even cheaper
than those of the public sickness funds, so almost 90% of workers buy it.22
Supplemental insurance helps pay for the share of the co-pays that the sickness
funds don’t reimburse.

16

This and other information concerning French health care can be found on the
World Health Organizations website at http://www.who.int/en/.
17 T.R. Reid, op. cit., 49
18 The Commonwealth Fund, Multinational Comparisons, op. cit.
19 T.R. Reid, op. cit., 53.
20 ibid.
21 ibid.
22 ibid., p. 50.
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Japan is Like Us—but Succeeds
France is not the only nation deserving consideration. Japan also has
succeeded in keeping its costs some of the lowest globally while achieving a
relatively high level of health care quality.
WHO ranked Japan 10th out of 191 countries for health care systems in 2010
based on overall health care efficiency.23 Although not as efficient as France, Japan
still ranks 17 places higher in efficiency than the United States.
Japan spends a mere 9.5% of their GDP on health care expenditures.24 Health
care costs the nation $3,24 per capita. These costs are far lower than those of United
States, and are even lower than the number one ranked France.
These low costs have not impeded Japan’s ability to provide effective health
care. Japan has one of the highest life expectancies at birth in the world (83 years).25
Japan also uses more health care services than a large majority of other nations,
including the United States. The average Japanese visits the doctor about 14.5 times
per year, three times as often as the U.S. average.26 In contrast to the U.S., nearly all
primary care physicians make house calls, either daily or weekly. The Japanese get
twice as many CAT scans as Americans, and three times as many MRIs.27 The

23

World Health Organization, Measuring Overall Health System Performance, op. cit.
This and other information concerning Japanese health care can be found on the
World Health Organizations website at http://www.who.int/en/.
25 This and other information concerning Japanese health care can be found on the
World Health Organizations website at http://www.who.int/en/.
26 T.R. Reid, op. cit., 84.
27 ibid.
24
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average hospital stay in Japan is 36 nights. In the United States, the average hospital
stay is 6 nights. The fees for surgery are also much lower in Japan.28
Japan, like France, has achieved universal health care. Their system involves
no lists or waiting, no gatekeepers, no rationing, and a broad array of patient
choice.29 There is a rigid cost-control mechanism in place to counteract these patient
freedoms.
What makes Japan a particularly useful model for the United States is their
health insurance market. Like us, they have multiple payers that are responsible for
different groups of people, usually based on the individual’s employer. Japan has
around 3,500 health insurance plans, falling into three general categories.30 Health
care is paid for through these insurance plans. The patient pays 30% of the doctor’s
bill as co-pay and insurance picks up the rest.31 There are monthly limits on
patient’s co-pay, which ensure nobody has to pay more than $650 in a single
month.32 Because the Japanese system is like ours in having multiple payers, we can
learn from them about how such a system could achieve better outcomes than we
do today.

Addressing the Issues Head On
Political pressures beginning in the 1920’s have led American health care to
its current state of ruin. Every president, beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt, has
had to grapple with the growing problems of our health care system. For nearly a
28

ibid.
ibid.
30 ibid., p. 86.
31 ibid.
32 ibid.
29
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century these issues were pushed aside because of the extreme opposition the
presidents faced.33 Now that Obama has finally succeeded in pushing through health
care reform, it is important to consider his legislation and understand the probable
effects it will have on the health care system.
This paper will explore the two principal factors driving the rise in health
care expenditures in the United States: the reimbursement system and the
fragmented care delivery. The experiences, successes, and failures of France and
Japan offer useful lessons for United States.
In chapter 1 I describe the reimbursement structure. The issues in American
reimbursement is explained, followed by a discussion about the reimbursement
structures present in France and Japan.
Chapter 2 depicts possible reimbursement structures the United States could
adopt. There are only three main types of reimbursement structures in health care,
but there are dozens of ways these three can be blended to create an optimal
reimbursement structure.
I explain the failures of American fragmented care delivery in chapter 3.
France and Japan offer two examples of various stages of successful delivery
integration.
In chapters 4 and 5 I discuss two examples of successful health care delivery
within the United States. The Mayo Clinic is a hospital with an international
reputation for its low health care costs and high health outcomes. Grand Junction,

33

For more information about the history of President’s struggles with health care
reform, see http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7871.pdf.
8

Colorado provides an example of a group of private practice physicians successfully
providing high quality care at affordable costs.
Chapter 6 focuses on the Affordable Care Act. I explain the Electronic Health
Records mandate and the Accountable Care Organizations provision. I draw
conclusions about whether the act will succeed in addressing reimbursement and
care delivery issues will be drawn.
Health Care is a vital part of any nation. It cannot be permitted to fail. In
many ways, the United States is on a dangerous health care path. It is time to
confront the issues inherent in this system head on, starting with the perverse
incentives created by the reimbursement structure.

9

Provider Reimbursement Makes A Difference
Reimbursement Methods Create Incentives
How doctors are paid and what they are paid to do can make a huge
difference to how they deliver medical services.
In the United States, the reimbursement system creates perverse incentives
for health care providers. This drives health care costs through the roof.
Understanding how and why the incentives are created is the first step to changing
them and ending the cycle of overprescribing and over-treating present in the U.S.

More Service, More Money
A study performed by Dr. Wendy Everett, president of the New England
Healthcare Institute, and Dr. Jules Delaune estimate the cost of unnecessary medical
treatment in the United States was between $158 and $226 billion in 2011 alone34.
This is roughly 10% of the total national healthcare expenditures. One of the largest
contributors to these unnecessary treatments is the fee-for-service reimbursement
system. Doctors are paid for every procedure. The more tests and treatments, the
more money the provider receives. The reimbursement system creates
overutilization of procedures and tests that are not medically necessary. These
services are usually minor procedures, such as a high volume of tests35. Excessive
use of antibiotics is often prescribed in lieu of an over-the-counter cold medicine.

34

Jules Delaune and Wendy Everett. Waste and Inefficiency in the U.S. Healthcare
System. Cambridge, MA: New England Healthcare Institute; 2008.
35“What is Driving U.S. Health Care Spending?: America’s Unsustainable Health Care
Cost Growth.” Bipartisan Policy Center, 2012: 8.
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/staff-paper/what-driving-us-health-care-spending
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However, in some cases more lucrative treatments such as heart surgery are
performed.36 Dr. David Jones received his medical degree and History of Science
degree from Harvard University. He currently is a member of the Department of
Global Health and Social Medicine. In his recent book, Broken Hearts: The tangled
History of Cardiac Care, Dr. Jones explains the heart surgery phenomenon.
Specifically, he mentions that angioplasty, a very invasive heart surgery, does not
extend life for anyone with stable coronary disease, and it is those patients who
make up a large portion of angioplasty patients. Dr. Jones said, “It has not been
shown to extend life expectancy by a day, let alone 10 years—and it’s done a million
times a year in this country.”37
Fee-for-service (FFS) exacerbates the cost impact of other drivers38. For
instance, “FFS encourages the application of new medical technologies to all patients
regardless of whether they are likely to benefit significantly or marginally from that
technology.”39 This provides incentive to advance medical technology, despite the
accompanying exorbitant prices.40

Overusing Technology Yields High Returns for Doctors
The high fixed costs that accompany medical equipment, such as imaging
devices, create especially strong incentives to overuse this technology.41 U.S. private

36

Ronen Avraham. “Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Warped Incentives in the U.S.
Healthcare System.” American Journal of Law and Medicine 37(2911): 7-40
37 Alice Park. “A Cardiac Conundrum.” Harvard Magazine (March-April 2013).
http://harvardmagazine.com/2013/03/a-cardiac-conundrum
38 “What is Driving U.S. Spending?” op. cit., p. 8.
39 “What is Driving U.S. Spending?” op. cit., p. 8.
40 “What is Driving U.S. Spending?” op cit.., p. 9.
41 ibid.
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practice physicians initially offered simple services. Many of these providers now
also offer expensive and high-end services, such as MRI’s, CT scans, and cardiac
stress imaging.42 Almost one in five physician practicing in the U.S. today reported
owning or leasing equipment for advanced imaging.43 The strong financial incentive
for doctors to personally provide such medical technologies is reflected in these
growing numbers.
As a result of this trend, imaging use has increased 70% during the last
decade.44 One study found that, in the case of cardiac stress imaging, the use of such
technology was “more common among patients evaluated by physicians who billed
for this service. This was especially true in cases where the physicians billing
included technical fees in addition to professional fees.”45 The study stated that the
normal recommended time for a routine stress test is within two years of
revascularization. The authors discovered that most patients were seen twice within
this two-year period. The six-month mark and the 12-month mark were the most
frequent visit times, and stress tests were often performed at one of these two visits.
These numbers suggest an association with elective follow-up visits.46 While these

42

B.K. Hollenbeck and B.K. Nallamothu. “Financial Incentives and the Art of Payment
Reform.” Journal of the American Medical Association. 2011; 306(18):2028.
43 J. Reschovksy, A. Cassil, and H.H. Pham. Physician Ownership of Medical
Equipment. Washington, DC: Center for Studying Health System Change; 2010.
http://hschange.org/CONTENT/1172/1172.pdf. Accessed January 4, 2013.
44 MedPAC. A Data Book: Healthcare Spending and the Medicare Program.
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun11DataBookEntireReport.pdf. Accessed
November 25, 2012.
45 Hollenbeck and Nallamothu, op. cit., p. 2028.
46 Bimal R. Shah, et al., “Patterns of Cardiac Stress Testing After Revascularization in
Community Practice.” Journal of the American College of Cardiology 56, no.
16(October 2010):1328-1334.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0735109710028020
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stress tests were not yet necessary, nor even recommended by the American College
of Cardiology Foundation, they were performed anyways. A second study compared
the use of radionuclide myocardial perfusion imaging, or MPI, among radiologists
and cardiologists serving Medicare patients between 1998 and 2006.47 The study
concluded that in recent years, there has been a sharp increase in the use of MPI
among cardiologists compared with radiologists. Cardiologist utilization of MPI
increased by 215%. Radiologist MPI use increased by only 32%.48 Most of this
growth occurred in private cardiologist offices. In hospitals, where private
reimbursement does not occur, radiologists still utilize MPI more than cardiologists.
The authors concluded that “Because MPI is a highly reimbursed procedure and
there is no evidence that coronary disease is increasing among the Medicare
population, this trend raises concerns about inappropriate self-referral.”49
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) studied whether
physician self-referral affected the use of imaging. Physician self-referral occurs
when a physician orders tests on a patient that will be performed either by the
referring physician himself or a colleague who reimburses for the referral. MedPAC
is an independent Congressional agency established by the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 (P.L. 105-33). Their primary purpose is to advise the U.S. Congress on issues
affecting the Medicare program. They found that compared with non self-referring
physicians, up to 22% more of self-referring physicians’ patients received at least
47

D.C. Levin, et al. “Recent payment and utilization trends in radio- nuclide myocardial
perfusion imaging: comparison between self-referral and referral to radiologists.”
Journal of the American College of Radiology 6, no. 6(2009):437-441.

48

ibid.
ibid.

49
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one imaging service.50 MedPAC reported, “physicians who furnish imaging services
in their offices order more imaging than other physicians.”51 They cited a study that
found after orthopedics in his study began billing for MRIs, the number of scans
ordered within 30 days of the patient’s visit increased by 38%.52

Resources are Meant to be Used, NOT Overused
The current payment environment in the United States incentivizes
overutilization of medical resources. A study involving Medicare patients and
treatment quantity received found that residents in the highest spending regions
“received about 60% more care than residents of the lowest spending [regions].”53
Higher spending regions are not necessarily wealthier areas. In this context, it refers
to areas that have higher health expenditures than the national average. In these
higher spending regions with more hospital beds per capita, patients are more likely
to be admitted to a hospital. Dr. Elliot Fisher, Harvard Medical School alumni and
member of The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice, states “it
has been shown that physicians adapt their admission and discharge decisions to
the availability of ICU beds, admitting more patients with less severe illness… when
more beds are available.”54 If more hospital beds are filled, Medicare spends more

50

MedPAC. A Report to the Congress: Medicare and the Health Care Delivery System.
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun11_EntireReport.pdf. Accessed November
25, 2012.
51 MedPAC, op. cit.
52 L.C. Baker. “Acquisition of MRI equipment by doctors drives up imaging use and
spending.” Health Affairs 29, no. 12 (December 2010): 2252–2259.
53 Elliott Fisher, et al. “The implications of regional variations in Medicare spending. Part
2: health outcomes and satisfaction with care.” Annals of Internal Medicine 138
(2003): 288-298.
54 ibid.
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on hospital care. This trend was the same for intensive care unit beds and CT scans
performed.55 Higher spending regions utilized between 52% and 77% higher
quantity of medical services than the lower spending regions.56 There was no
difference in health outcomes among the higher spending regions and the lower
spending regions. They established this by projecting each regions patient’s risk of
death. It was determined that despite higher health expenditures in some regions,
the risk of death differed little across spending levels.57 Dr. Fisher and his partners
“found no evidence to suggest the pattern of practice observed in higher spending
regions led to improved survival, slower decline in functional status, or improved
satisfaction with care.”58 Doctors do not only allot medical services based on actual
patient need. Medical services are often provided based on resource availability.
Some areas reward hospitals and physicians for expanding capacity and
recruiting additional procedure-oriented specialists.59 This is due to due to local
capacity, social norms, and the fee-for-service environment. Physicians in both high
and low spending regions make similar decisions in cases where there is strong
evidence for a specific treatment. However, physicians in high-spending regions are
much more likely to intervene in cases where there is no clear choice of medical
treatment.60 The author found that “in high-spending regions, 47% of physicians
schedule hypertensive patients every three months or more often, while only 19%

55

Elliott Fisher, et al. “Health Care Spending, Quality, and Outcomes: More Isn’t
Always Better.” Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care. February 2009.
56 Elliott Fisher, et al. “The implications of regional variations,” op. cit.
57 Elliott Fisher, et al. “The implications of regional variations,” op. cit.
58 Elliott Fisher, et al. “The implications of regional variations.” op. cit.
59 Elliott Fisher, et al. “Health Care Spending, Quality, and Outcomes,” op. cit.
60 Elliott Fisher, et al. “Health Care Spending, Quality, and Outcomes,” op. cit.
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of physicians in low-spending regions do so.”61 The study also concluded that
compared with physicians in the lowest-spending quintile, doctors in the highestspending quintile recommended an additional, “80 hypertension follow-up visits per
year, 14 spiral CT scans, 25 echo-cardiograms, 24 cardiac care unit admissions, and
29 gastroenterology referrals (per 100 patients in each clinical category).”62 There is
a perverse correlation between the income of healthcare providers and the number
of hospital beds filled, CT scans performed, and tests executed. To squeeze out the
apparent waste, someone will have to make less money.

The United States Culture of Money
New York Times Journalist Atul Gawande studied two towns in Texas, one
that had high costs and one that had low costs. He concluded that the town with
higher costs did not have better health outcomes than the other town. Medicare
ranks hospitals on twenty-five metrics of care. On all but two of these, the higher
spending town’s five largest hospitals performed worse, on average, than those of
the lower spending town. The higher spending town cost Medicare $7,000 more per
person each year than the average city in America. Gawande attributed this to the
“American culture of money.” According to Gawande, many doctors have an
“entrepreneurial spirit.” These doctors are innovative and aggressive in finding
ways to increase revenues from patient care. Many physicians “see their practice

61

B. Sirovich, et al. “Discretionary decision making by primary care physicians and the
cost of U.S. Health care.” Health Affairs 27(2008): 813-823.
62 ibid.
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primarily as a revenue stream.”63 Some doctors are either oblivious to the financial
implications of their decisions, believe that money improves their outcomes, or see
their practice primarily as a revenue stream, not a health care provider.64 Gawande
said, “The most expensive piece of medical equipment, as the saying goes, is the
doctor’s pen.”65 Doctors have the power to make medical treatment very costly for
patients and very rewarding for themselves.
This power is the heart of the American reimbursement problem. In the
United States, doctors are paid for quantity, not quality. They are paid as individuals,
rather than as members of a team working together for their patients. But not all
providers engage in this practice. Why not? This, according to Gawande, is the “$2.4
trillion question.” To change the perverse incentives of the fee-for-service system
we must answer it.
Not all nations struggle with perverse incentives. Understanding why could
help America solve our reimbursement problems.

The French Model
In contrast to the United States, the French system of health care
reimbursement does not create perverse incentives. The national government
ensures that the entire population has access to care. It dictates the types of care
reimbursed, and amounts of reimbursement. The government decides the role of

63

Atul Gawande. “The Cost Conundrum: What a Texas Town can Teach Us about
Health Care.” The New Yorker. (June 1, 2009).
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande
64 ibid.
65 ibid.
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the various participating entities.66 Health care is much more centralized in this
nation. And by objective measures, it is more efficient and less costly.
In France the government establishes national reimbursement rates that
apply to all health care providers. Details of coverage and reimbursement are the
result of contracts between the government, representing the big government-run
sickness funds, and provider unions.67 Examples of these represented providers
include hospitals and private physicians. This relationship is akin to Aetna and
UnitedHealth negotiating with doctors, hospitals, and drug companies to set fees in
the United States.68 The difference is that in France, only the providers are profitmaking entities. Instead of both parties attempting to reach the most profitable
compromise, only one party is worried about profit. This keeps the negotiated
prices lower.
Prior to any negotiations, the National Health Ministry sets the provisional
price of procedures. This includes the price providers may charge for most types of
treatment and the price of each prescription drug.69 After the prices are tentatively
set, the physicians’ unions and public health insurance funds representatives meet
to negotiate a final agreement.70 The final fixed rates to be used by all doctors for all
health services are known as the Tarif de convention, or tariff references. The vast
majority of practitioners, about 97%, conform to these prices. Those medical
practitioners and clinics/hospitals who do not comply are required to display their
66

Stephanie Brunner. “The French Health Care System.” Medical News Today (2009).
Paul Clay Sorum. “France Tries to Save its Ailing National Health Insurance System.”
Journal of Public Health Policy 26 no. 2 (2005): 231-245.
68 T.R. Reid, op. cit., p. 54.
69 T.R. Reid, op. cit., p. 54.
70 Stephanie Brunner, op. cit.

67
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prices to potential customers.71 The insurance funds will not cover any charges over
the official fixed price, so patients must pay for the difference entirely out of pocket.
There are two “sectors” of physicians in France, each with different rules
concerning Tarif de convention. Sector one, comprised mostly of private physicians
and other providers, is subject to the fixed schedule of charges. The prices
established by the government are non-negotiable. Sector two encompasses a
minority of physicians (15% of generalists and 35% of specialists). These providers
are permitted by the public health insurance funds to charge more for services in
return for giving up some social security benefits. The extra fee is called a
dépassement.72
The system of fixed charges has produced a considerable saving in the
composition of physicians. The average French doctor makes about a quarter of the
income of his counterpart in the United States.73 Most of the fixed prices set by the
Health Ministry amount to one-third, or sometimes one-quarter, of what the same
treatment would cost in the United States. 74
Americans may wonder how the French attract sufficient numbers of people
into medicine at these low compensation rates. One answer is that the system has
built in other financial incentives to make medical practice attractive. No French
doctor pays a penny to go to college or medical school.75 Since doctors graduate
with no debt, they are under less pressure to earn a high income. Additionally,

71

ibid.
ibid.
73 T.R. Reid, op. cit., p. 61.
74 ibid.
75 ibid., p. 62.
72
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malpractice lawsuits are rare in the French health care system. Because doctors are
seldom sued, they pay far less for malpractice insurance. Typical premiums for
French doctors cost less in a year than their American counterparts pay in a week.76

How the French Transformed Reimbursement
Numerous revisions of French health care policies have resulted in the WHO
ranking their health care system number one in the world.
In 1995, the general fund, advised by health care experts, began to issue
short lists of practices considered inappropriate. They also developed a handful of
more detailed evidence-based recommendations.77 If the Health Ministry did not
endorse procedures, they did not qualify for reimbursement. Unlike the current
reimbursement structure, most physicians outside hospitals were private and paid
under a fee-for-service reimbursement system.78
In 2005, the Douste-Blazy law restructured the reimbursement system to
reduced waste. The Union nationale de caisses d’assurance maladie (National Union
of Health Insurance Funds), or Uncam, was created when this law combined all
health insurance funds into a single organization.79 It negotiates agreements with
medical and paramedical professions about modes of practice. Under this law, the
government continues to set a yearly target for reimbursable health care expenses
and contract with the health insurance funds to manage the system.80 Uncam is also
responsible, with the assistance of the medical unions and supplementary insurers,
76

ibid.
Paul Clay Sorum, op. cit.
78 ibid.
79 ibid.
80 ibid.
77
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for proposing changes in what products and services are reimbursed.81 This
particular provision permits efficiency to be taken into account in decisions about
what services are medically necessary and economically feasible. The law
established an independent High Health Authority, who is the technical consultant
to Uncam and the government. Uncam’s general director was put in charge of setting
specific priorities and budgets, naming regional and local administrators of the
funds, and negotiating with the various providers.82
In 2006, the new general director of Uncam, Frédéric van Roekghem,
achieved the laws first major success. He signed a new contract with the heads of
three of France’s five physicians’ unions. Physicians’ remunerations were increased.
In return, the contract committed physicians to voluntarily changing their
prescribing practices to reduce expenditures.83 Under this agreement, doctors are
responsible for using medical services only when they believe the services are truly
necessary. Providers have an incentive to underutilize and use their judgment for
the good of the patient, instead of overutilizing to increase their payments. While
this could create an adverse incentive to severely underutilize services to the
detriment of the patient, France has not experienced this effect. Their high health
outcomes and number one ranking by the WHO prove this compromise has been
effective, at least for the time being.
Under the French health care system, patients pay some fee for virtually
every medical service. The fee is reimbursed by the insurance system in whole or in
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part in a matter of days.84 This system shows each patient exactly how much money
the government is paying on his or her behalf. Just as with personal bills that the
government does not pay, the people understand better just how quickly each
individual medical treatment can lead to huge costs for the nation. The
reimbursement system makes the public feel more accountable for their medical
services.

Japan: Same System, Different Results
Like the United States, the Japanese rely on a fee-for-service payment
approach. The difference is that, unlike the United States, Japan controls health costs
and keeps them low through strict government regulation.
Providers are bound by a fee schedule that sets the price and conditions for
all insurance plans.85 This creates a single payment system that is applied across the
board, despite the multiplicity of payers in the Japanese health care system.86 The
reimbursement structure provides equity to Japanese citizens, because the benefit
package is essentially the same for all social health insurance plans. This system also
reduced administrative costs and improves efficiency.
Doctors originally agreed to the fee schedule because they could charge
higher prices for patients not covered by insurance. They also understood that
patients enrolled in social health insurance would no longer default on payments.87
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The fee schedule controls the costs created by physician proscribing
practices. It controls the money transfers from all insurance plans to almost all
providers. Japan uses a three staged fee-revision process when modifying the fee
schedule. This processes also helps to control costs and minimize conflict among
various participants.88
Peer review panels inspect provider claims to ensure providers adhere to the
regulations for billing set by the fee schedule. About 1.4% of bills are denied
payment.89 In addition to inspection of provider claims, peer review panels also
perform on-site audits of medical records. The frequency of the audits depends on
the providers past record of complying with the fee schedule. If the audit reveals a
pattern of noncompliance to the fee schedule, the provider is required to pay back
the amount inappropriately billed for the last 6-12 months.90 This system ensures
that providers are not overcharging patients or over-utilizing medical services. And
audits control quality by standardizing physicians’ practice in line with the
regulations.91
The result is that Japan has among the highest rates of medical care provided
in the world. For instance, Japan performs 13.2 physician consultations per head per
year. The United States performs only 3.9 physician consultations per head per year.
In the United States, there is financial incentive to cheat the reimbursement system.
In Japan, there is financial incentive to adhere to the reimbursement system.
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The Japanese reimbursement system also prohibits extra billing, or billing of
services and drugs that are not listed in the fee schedule. These extra-charge
restrictions mainly focus on new technology’s that are still being assessed for
efficacy. They also prohibit balance billing, or charging more than the prescribed
price for a service.92

Revising the Fee Schedule
Every two years, the prices for services that Japanese insurers must pay to
doctors and hospitals are set in national negotiation between the Japanese Medical
Association and the national government’s health ministry.93 During this lengthy
process, the Ministry of Finance seeks to reduce reimbursement rates. The provider
groups lobby for increased reimbursement rates. The Ministry of Health, Labor, and
Welfare provide technical expertise.94 The next step is actually setting the prices of
drugs, devices, and services.
Japan uses this revision process to promote or discourage the use of certain
medical services. For instance, the reimbursement rates of physician home visits
have been increased to motivate doctors to increase this service.95
The reimbursement rate for imaging services in Japan is far less than the
payment received in the United States. American doctors charge between $1,000
and $1,400 for an MRI. In Japan, the price of a MRI is set at $105.96 This is the total
price of the MRI. The price is not this low because of a government subsidy. The fee
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schedule sets prices that are not much higher than the basic cost of the treatment.
Many revisions of the fee schedule system are based more on policy decisions than
objective evidence.
Most doctors in Japan graduate from medical school with no debt. The
government subsidizes medical school costs. For example one doctor had a tuition
that amounted to $1,500 in U.S. dollars a year, and the local government helped him
pay it.97 As is the case in France, leaving medical school with no debt frees doctors
from the financial burden of repaying the bill. Making a high income and receiving
the highest payments possible is not as important. Like in France, Japan has lower
medical malpractice insurance premiums. This is a result of far fewer malpractice
suits. In the United States, there are 50,000-60,000 malpractice suits per one million
people. In Japan, there are between 40-80 malpractice suits per one million.98

Conclusion
The reimbursement system in the United States costs the nation billions of
dollars every year. Some doctors exploit the fee-for-service system as a
moneymaking machine. To rein in costs we must fix the reimbursement system.
France and Japan show how it can be done.
The experience of France shows that fixed prices can lead to far lower health
care expenditures. However, the French reimbursement system results in doctors
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receiving a far lower income. Currently in the United States there are no alternative
fiscal incentives to offset the reduced income.
Japan uses a fee-for-service system similar to that in the United States, but
the Japanese system uses tight government controls to keep costs low and has
adopted a review process that provides financial disincentives for cheating the
system. Such a system might serve as a model for the United States.
The bottom line is that something must change. It is clear that it will take
tight government regulation to ensure that providers utilize only necessary medical
services. Whatever model the United States adopts, the experience of France and
Japan suggest that more stringent regulation of the private healthcare sector will be
indispensable if we are to curb rising healthcare costs.
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Possible Reimbursement Structures
The Main Three: Fee-for-service, Capitation, Salary
Fee-for-service is the most common for of provider reimbursement in the
United States. In terms of office visits, this structure represents over 90% of primary
care practice revenue.99 But there are two other main systems of reimbursement:
capitation and salary. Capitation pays the doctor based on the number of registered
patients. The more patients registered and seen, the more money the provider
receives. Under salary reimbursement, medical providers and other staff members
are paid based on a fixed salary that does not vary with the number of patients seen
or services provided.
The payment structure must enable the health care provider to receive the
highest payment possible while at the same time costing the payer the lowest
amount possible.100 In this chapter I show that no single reimbursement structure
will achieve all the objectives of physician remuneration.
A reimbursement structure that blends all three of these systems will enable
us to produce a significantly better system than the one currently in place. It will
blend elements of prospective and retrospective payment, or capitation and fee-forservice, by mixing base salaries, commissions, bonuses, profit sharing, and
innumerable complex and creative devices.101

99

Robert A. Berenson and Eugene C. Rich. “US Approaches to Physician Payment: The
Deconstruction of Primary Care.” Journal of General Internal Medicine 25, no. 6
(2010): 613.
100 James C. Robinson. “Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment
Incentives.” The Millbank Quarterly 79, no. 2 (2001): 150.
101 ibid., p. 152.
27

Restructuring the reimbursement system is one of the most vital steps
to fixing American health care. The relationship between doctors, patients, and
insurance companies are based in part upon the payment method used.102 As seen
in the previous chapter, reimbursement induces and rewards the doctor’s behavior.
Remuneration directly effects how the physician behaves, which directly affects the
health of the patient and the cost of treatment. It also affects doctor’s willingness to
work with others in their profession and put the patients needs first.

Capitation Reimbursement
“The major difference between fee-for-service and capitation insurance
systems is the assumption of financial risk.”103 Providers who care for patients
under capitation insurance are completely at risk for resource over-utilization.
Capitation discourages the use of resources. Because financial rewards are not
based on the number of services provided, physicians are far more likely to only
provide necessary treatment.
Under a capitation system the payer permits the practitioner to determine
how to allocate his or her own time and efforts between patients.104 Additionally,
primary care physicians are not reimbursed for services provided to their patients
by specialists or hospitals.
Risk adjustment creates a huge issue in the world of capitation insurance.
Historically only age and gender affected the setting of capitation rates. Health
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status was not considered. As a result, physicians were reimbursed too highly for
simple patients and received much lower patients than they should have for
complex patients.105 Many primary care physicians with sicker populations received
payment shortfalls. This provided incentive to offload their professional obligations
to others, such as specialists. Capitation often had the perverse effect of “pingponging patients.”106
Capitation gives physicians no incentive to work long hours or to perform
any and all procedures. The lack of focus on services provided creates incentive to
provide patients with minimal care. There is also an incentive to only see patients
requiring minimal care in the first place. Patients that might have higher health care
demands are often neglected. “Capitation creates incentives for undertreatment.”107
One study researched the accessibility to office-based physicians under
capitation reimbursement of children in the Medicaid program. Called the Children’s
Medicaid Program, it operated between July 1983 and December 1985 in Suffolk
County, New York. The 88 physicians that participated were randomly assigned to
an augmented fee-for-service group, a capitation group with a risk-sharing
component for referred services, or a control group.
Physicians in the capitation payment group were paid a fixed monthly fee to
care for each CMP.108 They were also financially at risk for other services the
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children used. A separate fund was established to pay for the use of services
provided by specialists and hospitals. The capitation physician shared in the surplus
or deficit of this referral account. If a surplus remained, the physician received 40%
as a bonus for having controlled utilization. If there was no surplus, the physician
was responsible for part of the deficit.109
The authors found that providers in the augmented fee-for-service system
saw their children more frequently than doctors in the capitation group.110 Although
there is no data concerning the quality of the care received, the authors concluded
that more generous reimbursement improved access.111
While capitation addresses many of the problems inherent in the FFS system,
it also creates some massive problems of its own.

Salary Reimbursement
Studies show that doctors on fixed salaries use fewer medical resources. T.
Godsen, L. Pedersen, and D. Torgerson performed a study on behalf of the National
Primary Care Research and Development Centre.112 They compared nineteen
studies and concluded salaried doctors perform fewer medical services than those
remunerated under a fee-for-service system. “Nine of these studies showed that
salaried doctors had lower volumes of consultation than FFS doctors. Five out of the
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nine studies that looked at the volume of tests and X-rays requested found that
salaried doctors ordered fewer tests than FFS doctors.”113 The results continued in
this manner, all proving that salary reimbursement results in a lower quantity of
medical services provided.
Of course, salary reimbursement is only feasible if the physician is an
employee accountable to an employer. In 2005, over two-thirds of medical practices
in the United States were physician owned. By 2008 that share had dropped to
below 50% of medical practices, and analysts say the slide has continued.114 Despite
this substantial increase in the number of employed physicians, it is generally
agreed that salary reimbursement will very rarely be successful on its own.115
Critics contend that salary reimbursement is not “incentive neutral.” They
argue that salaries dissuade doctors from seeing patients with complex health
problems. Treating such patients would require the physician to either increase
their total hours worked or reduce the time available to serve other patients.116
Since such physicians are not paid for overtime they have little incentive to work
longer hours. And because they receive their pay regardless of how many patients
they actually attend to, making sure every patient is seen is not as vital.
Salary-based models may lack the element of a “social contract” between the
personal physician and the patient. Salaried physicians often believe themselves
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accountable to the organization employing them, and not the patient. Dr. Robert
Berenson and Dr. Eugene Rich from The Urban Institute believe this can lead to
lower care quality and a loss of trust between the patient and physician.117

Mixed Payment Structures
Each of the three main reimbursement alternatives create incentives that are
damaging to the patient and the practice of medicine. They also create incentives
that cost the American health care system millions of dollars every year. This is
money our nation cannot afford to waste. Luckily, all of these reimbursement
structures also create positive incentives that can lead to better health care at lower
costs. The best way to structure health care reimbursement is to combine these
three systems, utilizing the best aspects of all three and minimizing the potential
adverse effects, to create a structure that rewards providers for producing high
quality care at low costs.
The most common blended payment form used by American payers
combines capitation payment and fee-for-service payment. Primary care doctors are
paid a flat monthly rate per enrolled patient. This payment is adjusted for age and
sex and limited by stop-loss provisions. The capitation is supplemented with fees for
specified carved-out services. The fee-for-service supplements ensure that sicker
patients won’t be neglected and “encourage a broader scope of practice.”118 This
reimbursement structure is similar to what is used in Japan, where remuneration is
used to change service quantity in certain areas of medicine. Office procedures
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using costly supplies the physician must pay for are often paid fee-for-service in
order to offset the their high costs.119 If it were decided that doctors were abusing
these services to generate higher income, the FFS reimbursement would end.
A second mixed payment method used in America involves complementing
the “Base Pay,” or pay for performance. Marginal financial incentives reward or
penalize clinicians based on “predetermined performance goals as reflected in
specific performance measures.”120 These performance measures attempt to
measure quality, spending, and/or patient experience. This reimbursement
structure is best used to supplement other payment methods. For example,
including a pay-for-performance reward system in a capitation plan could reduce
the tendency to underutilize necessary services.121
Specialty budgets with fee-for-service or “contact” capitation are utilized
solely with specialists. Specialty groups are paid on a capitation basis to provide
specialty services to a defined population of controlled patients.122 These groups
subcontract under the more general umbrella of a multispecialty Independent
Practice Association or health plan. Virtual specialty departments are formed and
are assigned a predetermined budget. This budget covers all visits and procedures
performed by member specialists.123 The total amount of money available is divided
first between primary and specialty care, and then among the various specialty
departments. Physicians with more experience often receive a larger share.

119

ibid., p. 160.
Robert A. Berenson and Eugene C. Rich, op. cit., p. 616.
121 Robert A. Berenson and Eugene C. Rich., op. cit., p. 617.
122 James C. Robinson, op. cit., p. 160.
123 ibid., p. 161.

120

33

Individual specialists continue to submit claims for payment on a fee-for-service
basis to the health plan or IPA. However, the amount of money actually paid for any
given claim is adjusted to ensure each specialty department stays within its
budget.124 In an ideal situation, cost-effectiveness is created since peer monitoring
and disciplining of inappropriate behavior is easier to spot within specialty lines
than across them.
While this type of specialty department capitation minimizes “overgrazing”
of the clinical commons, it does not eliminate it. For example, a physician might still
over-utilize medical resources, knowing the consequent reduction in unit prices will
be spread over the entire department and not just subtracted from that individual
physician’s reimbursement.125 The peer overview ensures that physicians who do
practice in this way are punished. The overall savings generated by this mixed
payment system outweigh the possible negatives.
Case rates for episodes of illness are another example of mixed
reimbursement structure specifically for specialists. This reimbursement structure
allocates probability risk to the insurer (who pays the physician only if the patient
needs care, and only enough to cover the costs of efficient care). It also allocates
technical risk to the physician, since the case rate is determined based on the
average cost to treat the episode.126 For example, “the case rate can cover cardiology
services for six months, but allow for recalibration of the episode time period if a
predefined important event occurs, such as a major complication or a patient-
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initiated switch of physician.”127 Under this structure, payment is made on a
monthly basis. It is also front-loaded to take account of the fact that most resourceintensive tests and procedures occur early in an episode of care.

Conclusions
No single reimbursement structure can be implemented across all health
care providers to solve the problems created by fee-for-service. However, creating
different structures for different providers is the first step.
Organizations employing physicians, such as hospitals, should embrace
salary reimbursement. Most institutions will need to provide additional incentives
for their employees to ensure their time is spent in an efficient and productive
manner. Including fee-for-service options with certain procedures or rewards based
on capitation and high health quality outcomes will address the issues created by
the salary system.
For physicians in private practice, salary is not an option. Instead, capitation
should be the main reimbursement method. Again, fee-for-service can be used to
ensure that specific health procedures found to be highly useful, such as vaccines,
are performed. Performance indicators can also be used to increase or decrease the
remuneration each physician receives.
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Fragmentation of Health Care Delivery
Health Care Fragmentation Costs Money
The fragmented health care delivery system in the United States costs the
nation billions of dollars each year. It has been estimated that the waste associated
with this fragmentation totaled between $127 and $199 billion in 2011.128 This
equals about 7% of the national health expenditure.
In addition to these huge sums, fragmented care delivery results in the
additional, non-quantifiable costs incurred by patients falling through the cracks.
Patients experience complications, hospital readmissions, declines in functional
status, and increased dependency. The United States health care system has created
a “too many cooks in the kitchen” scenario. The more physicians individually
involved with each patient, the greater the likelihood of mistakes.129 Fragmented
care contributes to preventable medical errors.
One study found that, in Medicare patients, “areas with one more medical
specialist per 100,000 population have $90 higher Medicare spending per
beneficiary, while areas with one or more family practitioner have spending that is
$30 lower.”130 In other words, areas with eight fewer medical specialists per
100,000 people and eight more family practitioners spend $1,000 less per
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beneficiary. This is almost a 20% decrease in spending.131 The same study found
patients in areas with more primary care physicians experience 3.7% higher overall
satisfaction with the medical care received.132
Fragmented delivery often results in overtreatment. The unnecessary
duplicate or unhelpful procedures cost the nation a lot of money. And overtreatment
can harm patients. Shannon Brownlee is the acting director of the health policy
program at the New American Foundation and is the author of “Overtreated: Why
too much medicine is making us sicker and poorer.” She concludes that tests
sometimes “lead [patients] down a path, a therapeutic cascade, where [they] start to
tumble downstream to more and more testing, more and more invasive testing, and
possibly even treatment for things that should be left well enough alone.”133
The fee-for-service reimbursement system provides incentives for physicians
to shun cooperation and work alone.134 The subsequent overtreatment costs the
United States between $158 and $226 billion annually.135 As Atul Gawande
observes, the U.S must “wean [health care institutions] away from their untenably
fragmented, quantity-driven systems of health care, step by step.” To improve the
health care system, Gawande argues that doctors must “collaborate to increase
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prevention and quality care, while discouraging overtreatment, under-treatment,
and sheer profiting.”136

Unified Care Achieved in France
For years France has provided integrated care delivery. They ended
fragmentation within their health care system and are reaping the benefits. In
addition to excellent outputs and low health cost expenditures, the French health
care system offers free choice among skillful doctors and well-equipped hospitals.137
In 1998, France instituted médecin traitants, or family doctors, who act as
gatekeepers to limit inappropriate access to specialists.138 The médecin traitants did
not immediately limit free choice or direct access to all doctors. Though French
citizens could choose not to register with a family doctor and seek health care
without a referral, there was a financial incentive to use these gatekeepers. Patients
who saw a specialist without a referral would be reimbursed for only 60% of the
cost. However, insurance reimbursed the patient 70% of the cost if the patient
sought a referral from their médecin traitants first.139
This process was revamped in 2005 under the Douste-Blazy law, which used
the structure of Union nationale des caisses d’assurane maladie (National Union of
Health Insurance Funds, Uncam) to achieve better coordination of care, with less
duplication of services. Uncam was created when the Douste-Blazy law combined all
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health insurance funds into a single organization.140 The law focused on developing
a shared, computerized medical record for each patient and giving financial
incentives to patients over 16 to choose a primary physician.141 Three of France’s
five physicians’ unions signed a contract with the new general director of Uncam,
Frédéric Van Roekeghem, shortly after this law passed. The contract required
patients to select a “treating” physician, without whose referral it is more expensive
to see other physicians.142
Each patient over the age of 16 is invited to choose a primary care doctor
(médecin traitant), with whom he/she signs a contract. 143This doctor becomes that
patient’s first point of contact with the health care system. If the physician or his
substitute in unavailable, the patient can consult another physician and inform
his/her caisse d’assurance (the organization where the patient registered their
médecin traitant as their primary care doctor).144
The reform produced promising results. By March 2006, one year after the
law went into action, 76.8% of patients had nominated a preferred doctor. 99.6% of
these preferred doctors were General Practitioners.145
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Dossier Médical Personnel (DMP)
France has successfully implemented a Nationwide Health Information
Network, known as the dossier médical personnel (DMP). This is an electronic
personal medical file that was authorized for use by clinicians in 2011.
Introduced as part of the Health Insurance Reform Act in August 2004, the
government was the driving force behind DMP adoption. Like all Electronic Health
Records, the DMP contains all information and data deemed necessary for the
coordination of a patient’s care between providers.146 The data is organized by
category in chronological order. Health care professionals who were approved for
access by the patient enter information into the DMP. All information is dated and
signed so the author may be identified. Providers are required to use health record
software that is interoperable with the DMP.147
One of the most popular aspects of the dossier médical personnel is that it
allows patients to take responsibility for their own care.148 They must consent to the
creation of their record, and each individual patient controls the conditions for
accessing it. European Union privacy laws and the French Public Health Code give a
patient the right to object to the exchange of the patient’s health information.149 The
ability to access these files by any and all providers does not equal permission for
any provider to open patient’s files.
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Organizations representing patient’s interests are working closely with
organizations of health care professionals to ensure patient’s rights are protected.
France has had to grapple the issue of privacy rights just as the United States must.
The nation successfully implemented the DMP while adhering to the privacy laws of
their own legislature, plus those of the European Union.

Carte Vitale is Insurance Made Easy
After the successful implementation of a nationwide health information
network, France created a simple process for insurance company billing and claims
filing. The carte vitale is a green plastic credit card with a small gold memory chip
embedded in the middle.150 It is the central administrative tool of French medicine.
The carte vitale acts as an electronic health insurance card. It contains
demographic and insurance information about the cardholder.151 The card shows
how much providers have charged for each visit and what was paid, both by the
insurance funds and by the patient.152 The card contains no medical information.
Every French citizen over the age of 15 has their own carte vitale. For children
younger than 15, insurance information is kept on his/her mother’s card.153
The card has made the payment of medical bills easy and efficient. Each
patient’s green card records which sickness fund and which private mutuelle (health
insurance plan) covers that patient.154 After the doctor enters the day’s treatment
on the patient’s card, he hits a single button on the keyboard to send all billing
150

T.R. Reid, op. cit., p. 49.
Amanda Grady, op. cit., p. 385.
152 T.R. Reid, op. cit., p. 58.
153 ibid.
154 T.R. Reid, op. cit., p. 58-59.
151

41

information to the relevant insurance plan. There is no middleman involvement and
administrative costs are extremely low.155
Automatic payment also makes the French hospitals dramatically cheaper
than any U.S. hospital. Despite a greater number of doctors and nurses per patient,
French hospitals have 67% fewer administrative personnel to keep track of
paperwork and billing.156 Administrative costs are kept below 5%.
The French Health Ministry insists there have been no breeches of privacy.
The gold chip is encrypted, affording the utmost protection to each patient.. There
are 50 million of these cards circulating in France. 1,000 or so get lost every week. A
lost carte vitale found can be dropped in any mailbox, from which it will be
forwarded to the national Centre des Cartes Vitale Perdues. About 80% of lost cards
eventually get back to the owner.157 Even those cards that are not returned to the
owner cannot be used to retrieve any personal information about the patient who
owns the card.
France has successfully implemented a system of coordinated care delivery
that keeps costs low and outcomes high. The nation was able to solve similar
problems the U.S. faces such as privacy and technology. The U.S. could learn many
things from this implementation.

Japanese Attempts at Care Coordination
Japan is in the middle of attempting to coordinate health care delivery.
Although not yet as sophisticated as France, they are further along in their attempts
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to end delivery fragmentation than the United States. The Japanese health care
system incorporates values that are highly prized in the United States. These include
employment-based health insurance and freedom of physician choice.158
Although some Japanese have a consistent primary care doctor, many do not.
Not all patients must go through a gatekeeper physician before seeing a specialist.
Patients may choose their medical facilities. They also may switch medical facilities
at any point during treatment159 These patient freedoms make it difficult for health
care workers to ensure each patient is getting the proper treatment.160
Financial incentives motivate patients to visit primary care doctors prior to
seeing a specialist. Patients who go straight to a specialist without a referral are
often charged a higher price for the service than insurance will reimburse. This is
known as extra-billing.161 But these financial incentives are not substantial enough
to persuade all patients to seek referrals from general practitioners.

Moving Towards Electronic Health Records
Japan has created an electronic records system to store and permit the
sharing of a patient’s records. Electronic health records will improve health delivery
by linking prevention and treatment and improving cost management.162
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The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare formulated the “Grand Design for
the Development of Information Systems in the Healthcare and Medical Fields” in
2001. The Ministry’s goal was to establish electronic health records in 60% of the
nations hospitals with 400+ beds by 2006.163
These goals have not yet been achieved. By 2005, only 17.9% of hospitals
with 400+ beds and only 6.3% of general clinics had introduced Electronic Health
Records.164 The government introduced incentives to stimulate adoption of recordkeeping systems. However, these incentive payments are considered too low and
there is resistance from medical professionals.
Hospital executives complained that the system would be costly to introduce
and would increase work for doctors as they struggle to learn how it works. For
smaller hospitals, the costs do not outweigh the benefits. The cost of introducing
electronic health records is $10,000-$20,000 per bed, and the annual upkeep is 10%
of the initial introductory cost.165 Small hospitals with fewer than 400 beds have
annual revenue of $110,000-130,000 per bed. Hospital management clearly lacks
the incentive to incur the costs of EHR with this low level of revenue.
Although Japan has not had the same universal success as France, they have
identified where their policies are lacking. The next step for this nation is figuring
out how to improve upon the structure they have created.
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U.S. Nationwide Health Information Network (NHIN) Attempts
Over the past decade, the United States has followed the example of several
European countries and attempted to create a national health information exchange
(HIE). The Center for Information Technology Leadership estimated such a system
could save $77.8 billion annually or about 5% of total healthcare expenditures.166
The two main components of the national health information exchange are
nationally uniform software and the Electronic Health Record (EHR).
The electronic health record contains all information traditionally in a
patient’s health record,167 including demographic information, progress notes,
medications, past medical history, immunization history, laboratory results, and
radiology reports. All a patient’s information from all providers would be available
as needed in a single file and accessible to all physicians with clearance from any
certified location. Providers could check for possible drug interactions between a
patient’s existing medications and a new prescription. Advocates of such a system
argue that it would reduce duplication of care.168

United States Attempts to Create the NHIN
In 2009, Congress enacted the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act as a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
This legislation encourages a greater number of physicians and physician
organizations to adopt electronic health records as a first step toward establishing a
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national health information network.169 The American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act allocated $19 billion to develop a health information software infrastructure.
Medicare and Medicaid incentives encourage doctors, hospitals, and other providers
to achieve “meaningful use” of electronic health records by 2015.170 For instance, in
2011 eligible professionals were able to receive up to $44,000 additional income
over five years by implementing the EHR.171
Despite the investment of $19 billion and the real prospect of meaningful
cost savings, the United States has not yet implemented a comprehensive electronic
records system. Currently, there are no uniform national technology standards to
which all physicians must adhere. Without these standards, there is no way to
ensure that all physicians’ databases will be integrated into the national health
information network. In 2009 fewer than 2% of surveyed hospitals have
implemented comprehensive EHR databases.172
In all three of the countries discussed, implementing a Nationwide Health
Information Exchange will help end fragmented health care. The success of such a
network can be seen by the successes of France. Japan has made strides, but teaches
other countries that incentives must be high for hospitals and providers to face the
169
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cost of EHR implementation. The United States must focus upon creating the
National Health Information Network in order to fully solve the issue of delivery
fragmentation.
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The Mayo Clinic: How Do They Do It?
Introduction to Mayo
In a nation of rising health care costs, the Mayo Clinic keeps expenditures
low. How do they do it? The answer could be the solution to our health care enigma.
Mayo’s costs are 32% lower than the U.S. average, while 95% of Mayo Clinic
patients speak highly of their treatment. Evidence proves these low costs are
achieved without sacrificing quality. The satisfaction ranking of the Clinic is three
times greater than that of the second-ranked institution.173 If every patient in
America received the level of care at the cost of the Mayo Clinic, we would save a
trillion dollars per year.174
Replicating the Mayo Clinic’s recipe for success would change the face of
American health care. Other nations have achieved quality with low costs; but so has
this American institution.
The key to Mayo’s success is its management structure.

The Management Structure Keeps Costs Low
The Mayo management system delivers quality care at a reasonable cost by
teaming physician practice leaders and senior administrators. These partnership
address both medical and economic concerns. Mayo is a physician-led institution.
Physicians head each of Mayo’s three spheres of activity—clinical practice,

173

Leonard L. Berry and Kent D. Seltman. Management Lessons from Mayo Clinic. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 2008: 199-200.
174 Jim Buckman and Mary Beth Buckman. “Improving on Excellence: Mayo Clinic and
the path to quality.” Quality Progress 45 no. 7(Jul 2012): 41.

48

education, and research.175 A balance between business-versus-caregiving is
achieved, while simultaneously supporting the Mayo Clinic’s core value of
teamwork.176 Dr. Marc Patterson, a physician at Mayo for over 9 years said, “Mayo
has been, from the beginning, a group practice. You really have to be a team player.
People in administrative positions understand that everyone is an important
member of the team.”177 The doctors are able to focus on doing what is best for the
patient, while the administrative leader ensures economic concerns are also
addressed.
The physician leaders continue to practice medicine during their 8 to 10 year
leader terms. They return to full-time practice in their specialty after the term has
expired. This system reduces the risk that the Clinic leaders will focus on
administrative concerns and forget human lives are at stake.178
The administrative partner ensures that the physician leader’s vision is
implemented in an efficient, fiscally sensible manner.179 While the administrative
leader does not have the same authority as the physician leader, he or she is vital to
the success of the Clinic. The administrative leaders help keep their associates on
the right track.
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The two leaders are on equal footing. Both leaders report up the chain of
command to those higher in the management structure. They are reassured of their
statuses as colleagues and partners.180
It is not only the physician leaders that are expected to make frequent rounds
in the clinic hospitals. Upper level management also reinforce the importance of the
patient by making rounds to observe what in the clinic needs attention.181 The
senior managers see for themselves what is working and what is not working.
Senior management and the staff are on the same page. Efficiency remains high.

Integration of Information
Dr. Patterson believes that the high level of information integration at Mayo
Clinic is a key to their success. He said, “Here at Mayo we can do things in a week
that elsewhere take several weeks to organize.”182 This is because Mayo is an
integrated health center.
Mayo integrates both professional and patient information. The integrated
Electronic Medical Record is the Clinic’s mechanism for knowledge sharing and
team medicine. It provides a complete medical history of each patient seen at the
Clinic.183 Both inpatient and outpatient information is included. Any health caregiver
attending a patient can easily pull up information about past medical services for.184
This recordkeeping system is comparable to the French dossier médical personnel
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(DMP) discussed earlier in this paper. Like the DMP, the Mayo record system
permits doctors to retrieve any and all relevant patient information. The integration
of information saves money for the clinic in multiple areas. The Clinic avoids waste
in the form of repetitive or unnecessary tests or treatments. Information sharing
also reduces the risk that patients will be subjected to unnecessary risk. For
instance, a patient’s allergy to penicillin would be recorded in the medical records,
and any Mayo staff member would be able to discover this and use alternative
medications.

Integration of Physician Knowledge
Every doctor at the Clinic has a wealth of knowledge accumulated over the
years. By combining all this information together via physician teams, doctors are
able to best help the patient. The Clinic encourages health care professionals
working together to provide optimum care. Even the physical design of the building
encourages doctors’ and other staff members’ to form teams. Hallways outside
patient rooms were built extra wide to accommodate conferences between medical
caregivers.185
A sophisticated internal priority paging, telephone, and videoconferencing
system connects all three Mayo Clinic locations. Doctor-teams include all staff
members employed by Mayo. Geography is no longer a limiting factor for groups of
physicians and specialists to work together for the good of the patient.186 Mistakes
have a higher chance of being caught early on. Involving a wider variety of opinions
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and knowledge permits the best treatment to be quickly decided upon and
implemented.

Reimbursement Structure
One Mayo Clinic surgeon said, “By not having our economics tied to our cases, we are free to
do what comes naturally, and that is to help one another out.”187

The salary pay system releases doctors from the perverse incentives of the fee-forservice system and keeps costs low.188

And doctors support it. The salary system eliminates incentives to work
alone and over-proscribe tests and procedures. Doctors are not rewarded for
attending to high volumes of patients. Without the risk of losing income, physicians
are more willing to collaborate with colleagues.189
To end perverse incentives William Mayo, the son of the Clinic’s founder, put
himself and all employees on fixed salaries so that they are free to focus on patients,
rather than compensation.
New York Times Journalist Atul Gawande explained that the salary system
works by pooling all the money received by physicians and the hospital. Everyone is
then paid his or her salary. Any money left over at the end of the year is funneled
back into the practice, rather than into the pockets of the partners.190 This process
creates a potential surplus of funds to be used to improve medical care. If more
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institutions in the United States adopted this model, it would reduce costs and
increase the quality of care.

A Culture of Patient- Centered Care
Though the Mayo Clinic has changed since its founding, a focus on patientcentered care has been a hallmark from the start of the clinic over 100 years ago.191
All employees look beyond purely medical needs to consider the overall experience
of care for patients.192 Dr. Patterson believes that the patient-centered culture of
Mayo is one reason the Clinic is so successful. He said, “At Mayo, the focus is on the
patient. The needs of the patient come first.”193
The Clinic seeks talented doctors who share its values.194 The success of this
approach is proven by the low voluntary physician turnover rates. Those for the
Rochester campus were less than 4% in 2003.195 The national average for all
hospitals in 2003 was 32%.
All staff members are expected to continually adapt their current practice
routine to better achieve the level of standardization and “best practice” required by
Mayo’s high standards.196 Everyone assists with quality improvement.197 For
example, if someone inside or outside the clinic makes a breakthrough and is
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routinely achieving better patient outcomes and reducing waste, other staff
members attempt to replicate that success.
The Clinic emphasizes teaching and mentoring. Dr. Leonard Berry, a
practicing physician at Mayo, stated, “The culture of Mayo is to teach one another
the Mayo way of doing things.”198 Unlike many other health care institutions, Mayo’s
employees spend a majority of their career with the clinic. This level of loyalty and
unity makes Clinic veterans more willing to make a personal investment to mentor
new staff members.199
Leaders at the Clinic are constantly introducing new programs to further
develop high quality care and maintain low costs. Onsite physician-patient
workshops improve communication and understanding between the two groups. All
members of the medical staff are required to participate annually in learning
modules. The focus is workplace diversity and mutual respect.200
The First Impressions: Service Excellence Program reminds the employees that
engaging the patient in a prompt, courteous, and competent manner is essential.201
The program includes training classes and reminds the staff that perceived high
quality does not rely solely on the treatments and procedures received.
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In 2010 the Clinic held a banquet to thank and recognize employees for
regularly striving for excellence.202 These recognition ceremonies provide
employees incentive for continued hard work, despite the lack of financial rewards.
Mayo recently implemented the balanced scorecard to improve quality of
care and lower the costs incurred. The card is color coded so that leaders can
quickly assess whether goals have been reached and it allows for quick adjustments
to be made.203

Conclusions
The Mayo Clinic is the largest multi-specialty group practice in the world. The
Clinic’s staff of nearly 55,000 cares for 520,000 ambulatory patients, and 135,000
inpatients a year.204 The Mayo Institution includes the Mayo Medical Laboratories,
which employs over 800 individuals in addition to the traditional Clinic staff.205 The
institution has served more than four million patients over the years, including
presidents and royalty.206 Clearly this institution is providing high health quality.
The size of the hospital, number of staff members eager to work there, and
willingness of patients to travel from across the world for treatment prove its
success. Even with the difficulties added by its size and reputation as a “destination
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hospital,” where patients expect to stay only a few days and receive high quality
treatment, Mayo succeeds across the board as a health care institution. If Mayo is
able to create such high quality at such low costs other hospitals in America can do
the same.
Implementing the Clinic’s management structure, integrating information,
and adopting a form of salaried reimbursement would be steps in the right direction
towards solving the problem of American health care.
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GRAND JUNCTION, COLORADO: SUCCESSFUL PRIVATE
PRACTICE
The Health Care System in Grand Junction
Although America’s health care system is not efficient, pockets of success
give hope the system can be fixed. One of these areas is Grand Junction, Colorado.
Located in the western part of the state, health care providers in Grand Junction,
also referred to as Mesa County, have created a health care system that provides
high quality care at low cost.
The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care documents the use of medical resources
paid for by Medicare in geographically defined hospital markets. In 1996, this Atlas
identified the Mesa County Hospital Referral Region (HRR) as an efficient health
care market.207 It is the only region to remain among the five lowest-cost Hospital
Referral Regions since the atlas’s reporting started.208
Studies show that costs in Mesa County are one-third of those in other areas
of the United States.209 The Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and
Financing determined that Rocky Mountain Health Plans (RMHP), which is an
independent not-for-profit health benefits provider, and the county’s physiciandirected Medicaid program saved the state $2 million annually between 2003-
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2006.210 In 2006 the Chatfield Consulting Group found that RMHP’s Medicare
program in Mesa County saved the federal government more than $13.7 million
between 2000-2002.211
According to the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, the average per capita
Medicare spending in Grand Junction was $6,599 in 2007. This is 24% lower than
the national average, and 60% lower than that of high-cost Miami.212 The Dartmouth
Atlas also found that in 2005, Grand Junction had only 60% as many coronaryartery bypass surgeries in its Medicare population as the national average.213 Mesa
County had 55% as many inpatient coronary angiography procedures as the
national average.214 The Dartmouth Atlas stated Grand Junction scored above the
national average on a number of measurements of preventive care, diabetes,
asthma, and other quality measures. The Atlas did a comprehensive study of the
treatment of 12 chronic diseases. The authors determined that Mesa County was the
most cost-effective delivery of Medicare services in the country. Medicare spending
over a two-year period in Mesa County was less than $21,000 per person, versus
$60,000 in other areas. The average number of hospital days in Mesa County over a
six-month period was 6.5 days, versus 19.4 days in other areas.215
A 2009 analysis by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission of regional
variation in use of Medicare services found Grand Junction had 81% of the average
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use nationwide and was the ninth-lowest service user among 404 U.S. geographic
areas.216 Between 2008-2009, Mesa County’s per-enrollee expenditures for acute
care for Medicaid beneficiaries were 37% the Colorado average.217 Grand Junction’s
doctors perform slightly fewer procedures than their peers elsewhere. For instance,
their rate of surgical discharges is 92% the national average.218
This region has many valuable lessons to teach those in charge of health care
reform how to create a successful health care system that links together private
providers.

How this System Began
The Mesa County Medical Society was established in the late 1800s. It was
the first medical group created in this area. Community Hospital, a not-for-profit
hospital still very active in the area, was founded in 1946. Early on during the
building of this medical community, the independent providers of Grand Junction
established a pattern of working together for the betterment of the community.219
In 1974, the Rocky Mountain Health Maintenance Organization, now Rocky
Mountain Health Plans (RMHP), was established. RMHP now offers Medicaid,
Medicare, and commercial plans. It is the largest single private payer in the region
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today and covers about 40% of the local population.220 It is a non-profit managed
care organization, and its commercial health insurance rates are competitive with
other parts of Colorado.
Also in the ‘70’s, the county medical society created a practice network.
Known as the Mesa County Physicians Independent Practice Association (MCPIPA),
its purpose is to address shared issues for area physicians. It represents
approximately 218 doctors, or 85% of the regions physicians.221
St. Mary’s hospital is the dominant provider in the region. It performs above
the national average on all but two of the 24 Medicare clinical quality indicators.222
A study discovered the average length of stay at St. Mary’s was 4.17 days, while the
average length of stay at other hospitals was 6.24 days. 66.1% of patients were
discharged directly to home from St. Mary’s versus other sampled hospitals, which
averaged 43.8%.223 In 1977, St. Mary’s established a family practice training
program to supply more primary care physicians.
The physicians of the region realized the necessity of an online medical
database. “Together, MCPIPA and RMHP voluntarily provided $2.5 million to
develop an electronic information sharing platform.”224 They relinquished control of
the platform to an independent local quality improvement organization called
Quality Health Network. Over 1,500 medical care staff members, including more
than 90% of Mesa County physicians, use this database. “The network routinely

220

Len M. Nichols, Micah Weinberg, and Julie Barnes, op. cit.
Marsha Thorson, et al., op. cit.
222 ibid.
223 ibid.
224 ibid.
221

60

analyzes local data, sponsors cooperative improvement activities, and supports the
physician association by publishing information on physicians’ care patterns.”225
The success of Grand Junction is even more impressive because it is not an
integrated system. Most of the health care payers and providers are unaffiliated, just
like the majority of the country.226 Emulating at least parts of this area’s successful
system could lead to great results in other parts of the country.

The Reimbursement Structure of Grand Junction
Grand Junction’s physicians are paid as much for a given service to a
Medicaid patient as they would have been paid for the same service to a Medicare or
privately insured patient. As a result, Medicaid patients gained access to private
primary and specialty care. The increased primary care access decreased their
utilization of expensive emergency room care.227 Dr. Michael Pramenko, a family
physician and a local medical leader in Grand Junction, stated that these flat rates
have resulted in little incentive to cherry-pick patients.228
Physicians are reimbursed based on a blended fee-for-service payment
structured for all patients regardless of insurance source.229 RMHP and MCPIPA
withhold 15% of fees from physicians. So instead of receiving $20 for a visit the
physician is paid $17, with the extra $3 entering a risk pool held by MCPIPA. If
health care costs are high, the risk pool is depleted. If costs are kept low, physicians
receive at least a portion of their withheld payments at the end of the year. This
225
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creates an incentive to keep costs low.230 Also, physicians who perform well on
quality metrics are rewarded, and the reward is greater if overall resource use was
prudent.231
Grand Junction specialists receive reimbursement rates that are closer to
those for primary care, unlike traditionally high specialist incomes.232 The
specialists of the area agreed to lower reimbursement, believing the overall health
of the region to be more important.
Finally, physicians are reimbursed for serving on various committees and
boards. This succeeded, “in getting prepared, effective participation and physician
leadership.”233

Cost Transparency
Family physicians gained substantial control of RMHP and MCPIPA early on
and created a system of cost transparency. Physicians are usually aware only of the
fees for the services they themselves provide. At Grand Junction information about
the cost of each treatment by each individual physician are available to everyone. By
making this information available, the Grand Junction system enables physicians to
take cost into account in deciding if a test of only marginal value is needed.234
Specialists and primary care doctors receive detailed bills from hospitals,
emergency rooms, and ambulatory care sites for patients they serve and the
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services the doctors order.235 The MCPIPA works with the RMHP to prepare lists
based on relative costs and the expenses of staying in the hospital. They then
provide price comparisons with the cost of specialists doing the procedures
themselves.236 The physicians are made very aware of the cost difference and
change to more cost effective practices.
The RMHP and MCPIPA worked together to create cost profiles of each
physician, which are available to all other physicians. These lists place peer pressure
on physicians to work hard to keep costs low and quality high. For example, if a
cardiologist performed twice as many catheterizations as his or her peers the list
would show this overtreatment. That physician would be publicly embarrassed and
“educated” about community norms. If there was no self-correction and practices
did not change, primary care doctors would stop referring patients to that
specialist.237

Strong Focus on Primary Care
Since its inception in 1973, primary care gatekeepers have been required by
RMHP.238 A signed referral from a primary care physician is necessary to see a
specialist.239 This ensures that the patient is in true need of their specific services.
Grand Junction primary care doctors are expected to be involved in their
patient’s medical treatment from start to finish. Rocky Mountain Health Plans
reimburses primary care physicians for visiting all their hospitalized patients under
235
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the care of specialists.240 Studies have proven readmission rates decrease, lengths of
stay are shortened, and follow-up and home health care services are improved if
PC’s participate in the care of their hospitalized patients.241
RMHP also uses financial incentives to encourage primary care physicians to
provide total care to their acute care patients. After-hours clinics and urgent visits to
primary care offices are subsidized and physicians are reimbursed.242
The measures taken by RMHP and MCPIPA have been successful in keeping
primary care physicians abundant in the Mesa County area. In 2006, Grand Junction
had 85% more family doctors per capita than the national average.243

The Specialists Do More
In Mesa County, specialists provide consultative services to primary care
physicians free of charge.244 The pathologist or radiologist will give over the phone
advice on what diagnostic tests would be most helpful and most cost-effective. By
contrast, many specialists across the country are unwilling to provide this service,
because without a patient visit, they will not be reimbursed.
The specialists in Grand Junction have given up a little income for the benefit
of their patients, their community, and the primary care physicians.245 This not-sosmall act of selflessness has saved the County money, while simultaneously
increasing the health of the patients.
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The Quality Health Network (QHN) and Data Sharing
In 2004, MCPIPA and RMHP voluntarily created an electronic health record
to reduce cost and increase health outcomes. It was created as a repository of
patient data for the entire medical community. The QHN enables providers to
coordinate and improve the quality of care while keeping costs low.246
The database also facilitates referrals to specialists. Because specialists can
access the electronic medical record on QHN, they no longer need to depend on
patient’s account of their condition.247 This reduces the chance of misdiagnosis or
wasteful treatment.
The QHN’s is also a messaging center among doctors and other offices.248
Good communication is achieved, which leads to better and more appropriate care
for patients.
The QHN is run by a board of directors and is assisted by several
subcommittees of leaders from all areas of the health care community. Around
three-fourths of its funding comes from Community and St. Mary’s Hospitals, RMHP,
and MCPIPA.249
In 2009, 1,569 licensed practitioners from 84 different organizations used of
this database.250 Network users include physicians and hospitals, clinics, hospice,
long-term care facilities, home care agencies, physical therapy, and many other
health care providers.
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In 2009 the State of Colorado gave Grand Junction a $4 million dollar grant to
install a QHN system to connect outlying areas such as Gunnison and Montrose. The
grant covers the start-up costs of building the network.251 QHN’s next phase will
establish greater compatibility with physicians’ current electronic medical records
to allow information to flow more easily in and out of the QHN repository.
The QHN helps Grand Junction significantly reduce unnecessary hospital
readmissions. This is achieved in part by better coordinating and better
management of the chronic care patients. Additionally, information sharing allows
clinicians to see how their own performance on quality metrics compares to their
peers.252
The Electronic Medical Record is not the sole type of data sharing that occurs
in Grand Junction. RMHP shares relative performance data on diagnosis-related
resource use by each physician. This information is distributed to all physicians in
Mesa County, and it provides a clear indicator of where each physician falls in terms
of health care outcomes.253 Health quality outcomes and cost-effectiveness are both
taken into account. While this data occasionally provokes tension, the vast majority
of physicians approve. They feel it facilitates open and honest communication about
many aspects of medical quality and has led to improvement in outcomes over the
years.254
RMHP also provides doctors with Epocrates. This is medical software for a
hand-held device that physicians may use to check information about drugs.
251
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Included are drug interaction, drug prices, dosing, disease, and a medical
dictionary.255

CONCLUSION
While Grand Junction is an efficient health care system, it is not by any means
a perfect one. An anonymous physician working in Grand Junction stated, “It isn’t
like we all get along all of the time; we argue and disagree.”256 Although physicians
have their ups and downs, the Mesa County is succeeding better than almost
anywhere else in the nation. Clearly Grand Junction has much to teach America. If a
county in western Colorado can establish an efficient health care system, it can be
done anywhere.
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Can Obamacare Fix the Problem?
The Realistic Effects of the Affordable Care Act
The comprehensive overhaul of health care known as Obamacare includes
provisions intended to increase access to care and lower the costs. Officially titled
the Affordable Care Act, it is the largest government overhaul of the health care
system since the establishment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965. An individual
mandate requires every American citizen to obtain insurance. The ACA includes
two provisions intended to change the waste of the reimbursement system and
fragmented care delivery. The first is an Electric Health Record mandate. The second
establishes the framework for Accountable Care Organizations.

Electronic Medical Record Mandate
As I have argued above, electronic medical records have proven very
effective in reducing health care delivery fragmentation. Section 1561 of the ACA
gives providers incentive to bring health records online. It does not require that
providers begin the framework for a national database.257
The growth of electronic medical records started under a Republican and
was continued by a Democratic administration. George W. Bush began the push for a
national electronic health record system. Barack Obama continued the work Bush
had started. In 2009, President Obama signed a stimulus bill called the American
Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA), which included the Health Information
257
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Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act. The Act dedicated $27
billion to the promotion of health information technology.258 To offset the enormous
start-up costs of an electronic health records system, Medicare physicians using
such a system can receive up to $44,000 of additional income over 5 years. The
Medicaid incentive program, created to support the growth of electronic medical
records, permits clinicians to receive up to $63,750 of additional income for those
who qualify.259 Hospitals can receive between $2 million and $10 million of
additional income over 5 years to offset the cost of setting up the records system.260
Unfortunately, the additional income barely covers the initial cost of these systems
and in some cases does not even cover the full cost. The average initial cost of an
electronic medical record is $44,000 per physician, and an additional $8,500 per
provider per year.261 While the money saved by these records is projected to be
greater than the costs, many physicians struggle to value long-term savings when
the short-term costs are so high.
A “meaningful use” standard was included to ensure providers were actually
implementing EHRs in ways that affect day-to-day business transactions. To pass
this standard, providers must be using electronic health records for the following:
electronic prescribing, health information exchange, automated reporting of quality
performance, electronically recording key parts of a patient’s history, creating care258
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summary documents, and implementing at least one clinical decision support
tool.262 In addition to these requirements, Congress created a list of functions that
physicians should attempt to also achieve. These include submitting key data
electronically to public health entities.263
The HITECH Act allocates extra funding for clinicians and hospitals that care
for more poor patients than the typical provider. This is to ensure these providers
do not fall behind with EHR adoption.264 Typically, these providers have fewer
resources to spend on expensive electronic health record systems.

Accountable Care Organizations
The Affordable Care Act creates Accountable Care Organizations, or ACOs, as
a way to restrict reimbursement costs. Modled on delivery systems such as the
Mayo Clinic,265 ACOs will seek to reduce costs and improve quality by putting
primary care physicians at the core of the delivery system.266 By emphasizing the
role of physicians rather than insurers or hospitals, this structure will permit
physicians to influence almost 90% of all personal health spending.267
The ACO will contract with insurance companies and account for the entirety
of care provided to a defined population. If the costs of care are less than the
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targeted amounts and certain quality measures are achieved, the ACO and the payer
will share in the savings.268
Mark McClellan is the current director of the Engleberg Center for Health
Care Reform. He is the former director of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, as well as the former director of the Food and Drug Administration. He
assisted in the push for the Medicare Shared Savings Program, and focused on the
potential of ACOs to bring down health care costs. In an article he co-authored with
Elliot Fisher, another health care veteran, McClellan stated that the approach ACOs
take to improve health care “focuses on helping physicians, hospitals, and other
health care providers achieve this goal by providing more financial support when
they work together to improve quality while lowering costs.”269 Proponents of
Accountable Care Organizations, such as McClellan and Fisher, argue ACOs will
change both the culture and practice patterns of providers. They maintain that as
these changes are institutionalized, all payers and patients will benefit from the
delivery of higher-quality, lower-cost, and better-integrated services.270 ACOs will
be held accountable for performance through changes in traditional Medicare
provider payment.271 These include financial rewards for good performance based
on comprehensive quality and spending measurement, along with monitoring.
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Provider composition of ACOs may vary geographically to reflect local
market conditions. Diverse entities could serve as an ACO, alone or in combination
with each other.272 The collective will serve as a local provider umbrella
organization, system, or network.
Despite their similarities, ACOs are different from HMOs. Although both kinds
of organizations are intended to emphasize accountability, modern HMOs tend to
focus on insurers. ACOs focus directly on health care providers and the delivery
system.273

Affordable Care Act and ACOs
Section 3022 of the Affordable Care Act creates the Medicare Shared Saving
Program (MSSP). Under the MSSP, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
will contract with ACOs.274 These groups then assume responsibility for improving
quality of care, coordinating care across providers, and reducing the cost of care
Medicare beneficiaries receive. It is estimated that within two years of
implementation, 20% of fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries would be assigned to
participating primary care physicians. 40% assigned by 2019 is the program’s
goal.275
Under the MSSP, the fee-for-service system remains intact. Medicare
calculates and sets the expected total expenditures for patients cared for by the ACO.
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The ACO is then assessed and measured for the quality of care provided. If the ACO
delivers high quality care at a lower cost, portions of the savings are given to all
providers within the ACO as a bonus.276 While currently there is only ACO
framework for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, the Obama Administration is
hopeful ACOs will spread to the private market.

Probable Effects of ACOs and EHR Incentives
The Affordable Care Act is a step in the right direction for the American
health care system. Change is needed, and many of the provisions in the ACA will
have profound effects on issues plaguing the U.S. However, the effect of the
provisions dealing with reimbursement and fragmentation of care delivery is
uncertain.
The Electronic Health Record provision is not a mandate. There are no
requirements that physicians install the necessary technology. Instead, providers
who do not will merely be ineligible for the financial incentives. In a study by the
Center For Disease Control’s National Center for Health Statistics, the authors found
that nearly one-half of all physicians currently without an electronic health record
system plan to purchase or use one already purchased within the next year.277
Despite this optimistic outlook, the challenge of creating and maintaining an
electronic health records system will deter many physicians. Gary Anthony, a
principle with KPMG Healthcare, has written that, “There is a level of uneasiness as
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to whether there is adequate funding to complete [adoption of electronic health
records].”278
The current incentives are too small to push providers towards undertaking
these high cost systems. As in Japan, most American physicians are part of small
practices. Their income is too low for them to pay for EHRs, and the financial
incentives are not enough to make implementation worth their time. Even hospitals,
which generally have more capital and greater ability to implement such record
systems struggle with the cost burden. A KPMG poll released in May of 2012
surveyed 220 hospitals and health system administrators that were attempting to
implement electronic health records. 48% of those polled said they were only
somewhat comfortable with the level of budgeting their organization planned for
electronic heal record implementation.279 9% were uncomfortable with the level of
budgeting, and another 18% said they were unsure. Only 25% responded saying
they were very comfortable with their organization’s level of budgeting.280
Accountable Care Organizations are the future of American medicine. They
provide an integrated system that focuses on provider-patient relationships and
removes the payer as a middleman. Unfortunately, the fee-for-service
reimbursement system was left largely untouched. There are quality measures in
place that are intended to counteract some of the negative incentives inherent in
fee-for-service payment models. Mark McClellan states that, in the most basic form
278
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of an ACO, fee-for-service reimbursement depends upon more factors than just the
volume and intensity of services provided. “The organization and its payers will also
track some meaningful results for the population of patients being served and percapita spending.”281 Any savings generated compared with the fee-for-service cost
provide an additional source of reimbursement for the physicians. McClellan admits
that the traditional fee-for-service and its “cost-creating tendencies” may persist in
ACOs. He conceded that, despite some evidence that early ACO adopters
experienced movement away from fee-for-service dependence, “that is not
necessarily going to be the outcome.”282 If ACOs do not follow the early adopter’s
path and FFS persists, the savings generated by this model will be minimal.
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Where Do We Go From Here?
The United States health care system is not beyond all hope. While there are
clear inefficiencies plaguing the system, institutions like the Mayo Clinic and
systems such as those in Grand Junction prove that America CAN PROVIDE
EFFICIENT HEALTH CARE!!!
France and Japan teach valuable lessons as we now strive to change the
problems within health care. The Affordable Care Act will also undoubtedly change
the face of health care. Its reach goes far beyond what has been discussed here, and
many sections of the legislation will have a significant impact on healthcare as we
know it.
America did not become the most powerful nation in the world based on
luck. We shall be able to overcome the health care crisis, as long as we stop focusing
on the politics and begin to truly look at the heart of the problem. Addressing the
reimbursement and care delivery failures will be a single step on the health care
road to recovery.
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